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ABSTRACT 
 
In modern economies and societies, the availability of information is central to better 
decision  making  by  citizens  and  consumers.  In  most  countries,  citizens  and 
consumers  receive  the  information  they  need  through  the  media,  including 
newspapers,  television    radio,  internet  and  etc.  After  1990s,  technological  and 
economic  developments  have  evolved  the  media  sector  by  converging  it  to 
telecommunications and IT sectors and by leading to new interactive broadcasting 
services transmitted by different technologies. These developments also increased 
mergers and joint ventures both at global level and national level. As well as these 
developments,  the  private  benefits  of  media  have  increased  concentration  of 
ownership in these sectors. There are many people who argue that concentration in 
media markets has a negative effect on diversity and plurality. Because of increasing 
concentration in media markets in recent years all over the world, many concerns as 
to  whether  competition  law  and  policy  is  sufficient  to  ensure  the  diversity  and 
pluralism  in  media  have  arisen.  Competition  rules  can  address  issues  of 
concentration, efficiency and choice and will tend to encourage dispersed ownership 
and new entry. However, they cannot guarantee any of it. Competition law cannot 
therefore provide the certainty we need that a significant number of different media 
voices will continue to be heard, or that prospective new entrants to the market will 
be  able  to  add  their  voice.  Moreover,  it  cannot  directly  address  concerns  over 
editorial  freedom  or  community  voice.  Therefore,  if  competition  law  and  policy  is 
assessed as a whole in the context of  media, it can be stated that it guarantees 
diversity  to  some  extent.  However,  because  of  the  objectives  and  criteria  of 
competition law, it cannot adequately ensure diversity and plurality itself. Because, 
competition law takes in to account the economic criteria, which are partly different 
from diversity criteria, its sufficiency to ensure diversity remains limited. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that although competition law and policy is very important in media 
sector,  it  cannot  completely  provide  for  diversity  and  plurality.  Thus,  although 
competition  law  is  an  important  part  of  regulation,  it  is  not  designed  to  deliver 
diversity and plurality in the media. Special media ownership rules exist across the 
world because the market alone, even regulated by competition law, is not thought to 
provide the best results for society and for democracy.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In modern economies and societies, the availability of information is central to better 
decision  making  by  citizens  and  consumers.  In  political  markets,  citizens  require 
information  about  candidates  to  make  intelligent  voting  choices.  In  economic 
markets, including financial markets, consumers and investors require information to 
select products and securities. The availability of information is a crucial determinant 
of the efficiency of political and economic markets.  
 
In most countries, citizens and consumers receive the information they need through 
the  media,  including  newspapers,  television,  and  radio.  The  media  serve  as  the 
intermediaries  that  collect  information  and  make  it  available  to  citizens  and 
consumers.  
 
The  recent  explosion  of  media  and  communications  technology  was  expected  to 
deliver consumers a brave new world of competition across all telecommunications 
and  media  markets.  There is no  doubt  that  today,  consumers  have  the  option  of 
receiving  news,  information,  entertainment  from  a  far  greater  variety  of  media  ￿ 
newspapers, radio, television,  internet ￿ than ever before.  
 
Unfortunately,  this  growth  in  variety  has  not  been  accompanied by  a  comparable 
growth of independent, diversely owned competitive communications services and 
media voices (Kimmelmann, 2001). A crucial question, then, is how the media should 
be  optimally  organized.  Should  newspapers  or  television  channels  be  state  or 
privately  owned?  Should  the  media  industry  be  organized  as  a  monopoly  or 
competitively? (Djankov, et al.,  2001) 
 
Therefore, the issue of ownership control and related effects should be explored. The 
tendency, has been towards increased concentration of ownership of the individual 
media in fewer and fewer hands, as well as the development of integrated ownership 
patterns across several media. What this means in practical terms is that a relatively 
small number of individuals decide what television programs will be broadcast, what 
issues will be investigated and reported.  
 
Almost all modern democracies regulate the media sector in some detail. Regulation 
of media has been one of the sensitive fields for nation states because of its central 
importance for freedom of expression, democracy and national culture. The main aim 
of the media regulation is to ensure diversity that is considered as a guarantee for 
pluralism, working of democracy and national culture. 
 
Diversity of the media, accurate and honest reporting of the news is considered to be 
vital for guaranteeing pluralism of opinion, adequate political representation and a 
citizen's participation in a democratic society.  
 
A pluralistic media is seen to meet the demands of democracy by providing citizens 
with a broad range of information and opinions; to represent minorities giving them 
the opportunity to maintain their separate existence in a larger society; to reduce the 
event  of  social  conflict  by increasing  understanding between  conflicting  groups or   3 
interests;  to  contribute  to  overall  cultural  variety;  to  facilitate  social  and  cultural 
change, particularly when it provides access to weak or marginal social groups.  
 
In contrast, media concentration is widely considered to have a detrimental impact 
upon  pluralism.  In  particular,  concentration  of  the  media  market  curtails  the 
representation of a wide range of political and cultural societal groups (Harcourt ve 
Verhulst,  1998).  The  wide  consensus  on  the  view  that  media  concentration  is 
dangerous for democratic representation is reflected in many regional and national 
policy and legislative documents
1. From a policy point of view, economic efficiency 
aspects of media concentration, such as price-cost margins on newspaper copies, 
are  likely  to  be  outweighed  by  concerns  that  increased  media  concentration  may 
have adverse effects on the democratic process. This issue is reflected  in special 
provisions in, or amendments to, competition laws, government subsidies and other 
policies  designed  to  counter  concentration  tendencies  or  mitigate  the  effects  of 
increasing concentration (Hackner and Nayberg, 2000). 
 
 
Consequently, we can say that special media ownership rules exist across the world 
because  the  market  alone,  even  regulated  by  competition  law,  is  not  thought  to 
provide  the  best  results  for  society  and  for  democracy.  Because  of  increasing 
concentration in media markets in recent years all over the world, many concerns as 
to  whether  competition  law  and  policy  is  sufficient  to  ensure  the  diversity  and 
pluralism in media have arisen.  
 
In  this  context,  this  essay  is  intended  to  examine  the  extent  of  sufficiency  of 
competition law and policy to provide for diversity and pluralism in media. But before 
discussing how competition law can be applied media sector, we can analyze that 
what is media and what are main features of it? Because they are very important to 
understand how and why we try to regulate it. So in second and third chapter of this 
essay, I try to describe the media and especially their economic features. In fourt 
chapter I mentioned shortly the terms of plurality and diversity. Then in chapter five 
and six, means of media concentration and regulations are explained. And finally, in 
the chapter seven, competition law applications in media sector and it￿s adequacy are 
discussed.  Consequently,  I  can  say  that in this  essay, i  try  to reach  the  reasons 
behind why we regulate the media sector concentration in addition to competition 







                                                 
1 Especially the opinions and resolutions of the Council of Europe on media concentration are important and 
interesting within that context. The 1982 Declaration on the freedom of expression and information states the 
importance of an "existence of a wide range of independent and autonomous media, permitting the reflection of 
diversity  of  ideas  and  opinions".  Freedom  of  expression  is  guaranteed  in  the  Article  10  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom  to  hold  opinions  and  to  receive  and  impart  information  and  ideas  without  interference  by  public 
authority and regardless of frontiers￿" (Harcourt ve Verhulst, 1998) 











2.  WHAT IS MEDIA ? 
 
Actually  media    are  the  print  (newspaper,  magazines,  etc.)  and  electronic 
communication devices (radio and television). Usually we use this term instead of 
mass communications in a daily life.  But, in this essay, I use the terms as a form of 
communication by which messages are created by organizations and distributed to 
audiences. Typically, the audience of media message is large and members receive 
the message with near simultaneity
2.  
 
2.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDIA 
 
Demsetz (1989) hypothesize that the ￿amenity potential￿, also known as ￿the private 
benefits  of  control￿,  arising  from  owning  media outlets is  extremely  high. In  other 
words, the non-financial benefits, such as fame and influence, obtained by controlling 
a  newspaper  or  a  television  station  must  be  considerably  higher  than  those  from 
controlling a firm of comparable size in, say, the bottling industry.  Also economic 
theory predicts that private control of media firms should be highly concentrated.  
 
According to Tyner (1997), media have seven key concepts: 
 
1.  All  media  are  constructions.:  The  media  do  not  present  simple  reflections  of 
external  reality;  they  present  productions,  which  have  specific  purposes.  The 
success  of  these  productions  lies  in  their  apparent  naturalness.  However, 
although they appear to be natural, they are in fact carefully crafted constructions 
that have been subjected to a broad range of determinants and decisions. Media 
are manufactured constructs. Careful planning and execution has gone onto the 
process of constructing the media into a seemingly natural reality.  
 
2.  Media  construct  reality.  Although  media  are  not  real,  they  are  influential  in 
shaping our attitudes, behavior and ideas about the world. The media provides us 
with information about people, places, and things which we may not know about. 
This media information is sometimes used as the basis for our decision making.  
 
3.  Audiences negotiate meaning. Audiences use their minds to make sense of the 
information. As individuals or as groups, we anticipate the codes and conventions 
in  media as  we  "read"  sense into  the  message.  Basic  to an  understanding of 
media is an awareness of how we interact with media texts. When we look at any 
media text, each of us finds meaning through a wide variety of factors: personal 
                                                 
2 For more details see; http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/M/htmlM/masscommunic/masscommunic.htm    5 
needs  and  anxieties,  the  pleasures  or  trouble  of  the  day,  racial  and  sexual 
attitudes, family and cultural background. All of these have a bearing on how we 
process information.  
 
 
4.  Media have commercial implications. Billions of dollars are associated with media 
industries. Advertising drives media industries. The commodity that is bought and 
sold is the audience.  
 
5.  Media contain value messages. Media are not value free. All media has explicit or 
implicit values and ideology. All media products are advertising in some sense - 
for themselves, but also for values or ways of life. They usually affirm the existing 
social system. The ideological messages contained in. 
  
6.  Media have social and political implications. Media not only sells products but also 
ideas, messages, political candidates and has the power to shape audiences into 
political constituencies. Media technologies have the power to alter our culture 
and the way we use our leisure times.  
 
7.  Media have unique aesthetic forms that are closely related to content. There is an 
artistry and creative vision in the media that we are exposed to. Each medium has 
unique codes and conventions that influence its content.  
 
 
2.2. MEDIA TYPES 
 
Different media serve different needs, have different content and differ widely in their 
impact and effect. People use different media in different ways, spend vastly different 
amounts of time in different media environments, consume services under different 
circumstances and pay for them in different ways. As a result, competition between 
the media is muted in the marketplace and, in some respects, the specialization of 
each  is  worth  preserving  because  of  the  unique  functions  provided  in  the 
marketplace of ideas (Cooper, 2001a). 
 
The sectors of the media market divided by the Tabernero and Carjaval (2001) are: 
 
-  General news daily press 
-  Economic newspapers  
-  Magazines  
-  Publishing houses  
-  Over-the-air radio  
-  Open television  
-  Pay television  
-  Cinema film distribution  
-  Music industry  
-  Advertising agencies  
-  Internet  
 
At this point, we can shortly identify to four of all: TV, internet, radio and newspapers. 
   6 
A. Television 
 
Clearly, television is a unique communications medium unlike any other. Television 
incorporates a significant nonverbal component, which not only serve to suppress the 
importance of content but also requires little deliberative message processing. TV 
networks still dominate the most valuable viewing time ￿ prime time ￿ and capture 
the lion￿s share of national advertising markets Network TV is primarily a nationally 
oriented  medium.  National  advertising  revenue  accounts  for  the  majority  of  its 
revenue. Television has been the primary source of news for over a decade.  
 
 
Cable  TV  has  become  distribution  mechanism  for  national  programming  to  its 
subscribers. In contrast to network TV, which is funded entirely by advertising, cable 
is funded primarily by subscription revenues although national advertising revenues 





The internet appears to occupy a new media space and is starting to look a lot more 
like cable than broadcast in its revenue model. 
 
For the vast majority, it is a shopping mall at the fingertips of subscribers, enhancing 
daily activities. Internet traffic is made up of a couple of hours on online time per 
week spread over a dozen sessions with a  minute or so at any given page. The 




C. Radio and Newspapers 
 
Newspapers provide a different type of information service with different impact. They 
also provide a different news function than video or radio, with much longer and in 
depth treatment of issues. In this they have adapted to a role that is distinct from 
television. 
 
Radio, newspapers and magazines are substitutes from an advertiser￿s perspective. 
The stability of their market shares indicates that they are not likely to be greatly 
eroded  by  new  media  in  the  near  term.  There  is  some  evidence  that  cable  and 
newspapers are cross elastic, which reflects the fact that they are both local. 
 
2.3. MEDIA EVALUATION 
 
Examining performance of media industries ought to be the ultimate step in media 
analysis. We need to select performance criteria that are as precise as possible: How 
well  has  a  media  industry  functioned  when  compared  to  some  ideal  standard?  If 
there is market failure, then is there a regulatory remedy to correct that failure? 
 
Dennis  McQuail￿s  suggest  six  media  performance  norms  that  encompass  most 
judgements and take them up in order of ease of use (Gomery, 2000).   7 
 
1.  EFFICIENCY: Media industries ought not waste resources; that is they should be 
as efficient as possible. This is the sole criterion of the free market approach. 
Monopolists  waste  resources  in  order  to  maintain  their  position  of  power. 
However, what about control by a few firms?  
 
2.  MULTIPLE VOICES: Media industries ought to facilitate free speech and political 
discussion. A democracy needs freedom of expression to make it work and the 
mass media ought to be open enough to promote debate of all points of view. The 
marketplace of ideas calls for criteria of accuracy and completeness. This surely 
much count in any definition of diversity. 
 
3.  PUBLIC ORDER: Media industries ought to facilitate public order. In times of war, 
violence,  and  crime,  how  should  we  regulate  the  media  (if  at  all)  to  ensure 
differences? This is a growing area of concern as the media easily jump across 
national (and local) boundaries. 
 
4.  CULTURAL  QUALITY:  Media  industries  ought  to  protect  and  maintain  cultural 
quality  and  offer  some  product  diversity.  Can  advertising-generated-revenue 
companies  develop  quality  programming,  and  not  simply  dish  up  more 
sensationalism?  Here  the  issue  of  use  of  television  in  elections  becomes 
paramount. This surely must count in any analysis of diversity and localism. 
 
5.  TECHNICAL CHANGE: Media industries ought to bring to the marketplace new 
technologies as quickly as possible. It has long been known that monopolies and 
collusive oligopolies resist the innovation of new technologies in order to protect 
their highly profitable status quo positions. 
 
6.  EQUITY:  Media  industries  ought  to  equitable.  Should  members  of  groups  in 
society  be  shut  out  of  the  mass  media  industries  either  as  employees  and 
managers, or as consumers? For consumers, access is becoming more and more 
restrictive as a larger share of the mass media go to direct payment.  
 
3. MEDIA ECONOMICS 
 
The media products have two functions, on the one hand for the recipients and on 
the other hand for the advertisers. According to these two functions, media products 
can be traded on two markets.Thus, recipient demand is based upon content, in fact 
on its informative and/or entertainment function. To the advertisers on the other hand, 
it  is  the  function  of  the  content  as  ￿facilitator￿  in  accessing  the  interest  of  the 
recipients which is of central importance.  
 
Media markets tend to share usually these common features : 
 
1.  They are often highly concentrated
3.  
 
2.  Media  firms,  such  as  newspapers,  magazines  and  commercial  television 
channels, operate simultaneously in two sub-markets:  media firms that publish 
                                                 
3 This issue is covered in Section 5.   8 
newspapers  or  magazines  have  to  consider  two  markets,  the  markets  for  the 
medium itself (primary market) and the market for advertising (secondary market). 
Hackner and Nayberg (2000) say that, the interrelationship of the sub-markets is 
a salient characteristic of mass media.  Even though this interrelationship is not 
an  exclusive  characteristic  of  media  markets
4,  they  are  surely  an  important 
example for this phenomenon. The deciding feature of interrelated markets is the 
interdependency of the respective demands
5 (Dewenter, 2003). Not only do they 
sell their products to readers, viewers or listeners, they also sell advertising space 
to  firms.  These  markets  are  generally  interrelated  on  the  demand  side.  For 
example, the value of placing an ad in a local newspaper increases in the paper￿s 
circulation, and the subscribers￿ valuation of the newspaper may well increase in 
say the amount of classified ads. It is sometimes argued that demand linkages of 
this type give rise to positive spirals that partly explain the strong concentration 
tendencies  in  media  markets.  Of  course,  the  media  consumer￿s  valuation  of 
advertising may depend on the type of advertising as well as the type of media. 
Needless to say, the fact that the production of media content often involves high 
fixed  costs  further  increases  the  benefits  conferred  by  size  (Hackner  and 
Nayberg, 2000). Therefore, interrelated markets can be described as a peculiar 
phenomenon,  which  is  not  comparable  with  typical  product  market  relations 
(Dewenter, 2003).  
 
3.  Because of interrelation of sub markets, at least two or three different prices have 
to be considered by the publisher or broadcaster. For example, internet provider 
has to optimise access fees on the one hand and advertising rates for banners on 
the other hand. Also television and radio stations have to consider primary and 
secondary  markets,  the  broadcasting  and  advertising  market.  The  cinema 
operator is faced with the demand for three different products, therefore she has 
to optimise the respective prices.Apart from ticket prices and advertising rates, 
also a vector of concession rates has to be set.  
 
4.  Especially  the  (print)  media  exhibits  large  economies  of  scale.  Moreover,  the 
existence of these scale economies is frequently asserted as a main reason for 
the persistent concentration in media markets and therefore for market power.  
 
5.  Furthermore,  intra-industry  concentration  and  also  cross-ownership  of  media 
products  is  a  characteristic  worth  mentioning.  There  are  several  firms  which 




                                                 
4  Interrelated  markets,  also  exist  in  other  sectors  (even  though  they  are  frequently  associated  with  media 
markets). Sports events, for example, combine several markets, where the demand for advertising, concession, 
broadcasting and, last but not least, the event itself are characterised by interdependency. And also other events 
like music concerts or theatre performances and, additionally, institutions like amusement parks are all different 
types of interrelated markets if advertising plays any role for these events. Further features of media markets  
5    Markets  are  said  to  be  interrelated  if  the  demand  for  advertising  and  the  demand  for  the  media  are 
interdependent (e.g.,readers are interested in advertising and the advertising customers are interested in number 
of readers). In related markets there is only a one-way relationship (e.g.,readers are not interested in advertising, 
but advertising customers are still interested in circulation). 
6  Some  few  examples  of  the  largest  worldwide  acting  cross-ownership  firms  are  AOL  Time  Warner  , 
Bertelsmann,Viacom, Rupert Murdoch ￿s News Corporation .    9 
6.  A further characteristic of media products is an effect that can be described in 
terms of habit formation or addictive behaviour. Newspaper habit and particularly 
internet  addiction  are  phenomena  subject  to  psychological  and  psychiatric 
research. 
 
7.  Mass media can be described as network goods. In this connection, the internet 
should be beyond dispute, because of its physical network properties, but also 
newspapers, magazines or television programmes can be considered as some 
kind of network products, namely in the sense of social networks. 
 
8.  Media  products  are  also  frequently  characterized  by  price  discrimination. 
Newsstand prices (i.e.of newspapers or magazines) and subscription rates are 
typically  differentiated.  The  same  is  true  for  internet  portals  or  for  pay  TV 
programmes. 
 
9.  Finally, regulation is also an important feature of mass media. Because of the 
existence  of  economic  factors  like  scale  economies,  barriers  to  entry  and 
relatively high fixed costs, but also for political reasons the media sector is usually 




4. DIVERSITY and PLURALISM   
 
In many sources, we can see that diversity and pluralism, which are stated amongst 
the aims of media regulation, are used interchangeably (for example Gibbons, 1999). 
On the other hand, pluralism and diversity can be used in different meanings. For 
example,  in  the  Consultation  Paper  of  the  UK  Government  on  Media  Ownership 
Rules (2001), there is a clear distinction between diversity and pluralism.  
 
Diversity and pluralism have been two of the central objectives of communications 
policymaking.  According  to  Napoli  (2000),  diversity  as  a  policy  objective  grows 
directly out of the marketplace of ideas metaphor￿s advocacy of the "widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources" in an effort to 
promote goals such as informed decision making, cultural pluralism, citizen welfare, 
and a well-functioning democracy.  
 
Regardless  of  whether  one  takes  a  purely  democratic  theory  approach  or  purely 
economic theory approach to the marketplace of ideas, the concept still emphasizes 
maximizing  both  the  number  of  participants  in  the  marketplace  and  the  range  of 
ideas, viewpoints, and cultural perspectives available to citizens/consumers. 
 
Table 1: Diversity Components, Subcomponents, and Assumed Relationships. 
Source Diversity  Content Diversity  Exposure Diversity 
 
1.  Ownership 
         a. Programming 
         b. Outlet 
2.  Workforce 
 
1. Format/Program Type  
2. Demographic  
3. Idea/Viewpoint 
 
1.  Horizontal 
2.  Vertical 
Source: FCC   10 
 
This model builds upon and extends the source-outlet-viewpoint diversity framework 
traditionally employed by the FCC. The concept of source diversity here is defined in 
terms of both content and outlet ownership (￿source￿ and ￿outlet￿ diversity under the 
Commission￿s  definitions).  In  addition,  the  concept  of  source  diversity  also 
encompasses workforce diversity, which is defined in terms of the ethnic and gender 
composition of a media outlet￿s workforce.  
 
Content diversity is defined not only in terms of diversity of viewpoints, but also in 
terms of diversity of program types  and demographic diversity, which refers to the 
ethnic and gender composition of those represented in media content.  
 
As the figure indicates, the traditional presumption that has guided policymaking is 
that source diversity promotes content diversity.  
 
Exposure  diversity  refers  to  the  diversity  of  content  or  sources  consumed  by 
audience  members,  which,  of  course,  may  be  very  different  from  the  diversity  of 
content  or  sources  available.  Assessing  exposure  diversity  can  focus  on  either 
horizontal  exposure  diversity  or  vertical  exposure  diversity.  Horizontal  exposure 
diversity refers to the distribution of audiences across all available content options, 
while vertical exposure diversity refers to the diversity of content consumption within 
individual audience members. (Napoli, 2000). 
 
According to the UK Governmnet Consultation Paper (2001), diversity and plurality 
are  delivered  by  different  means.Diversity  refers  to  the  variety  of  different 
programmes, publications and services that are available, whereas plurality is about 
the choice people can make between different providers of those services. Both are 
key to the quality of service and the range of news and opinion we as citizens receive 
from the media.  
 
Since diversity is about the availability of a wide range of content, it has traditionally 
been maintained through content regulation, rather than ownership controls. Some 
media companies, however, argue that deregulation of the market is the best way to 
ensure true diversity (Jowell and Hewitt, 2002).  
 
With plurality it is not content but the source of that content that matters, the company 
controlling it, the ￿voice￿ behind it. We want a plurality of voices, giving the citizen 
access to a variety of views that, in a competitive market, maintain their own balance. 
We need regulation that is specifically directed to ensure such plurality. That is why 
government have imposed rules on media ownership. 
 
In  its  2001  consultation  paper,  UK  Government  set  out  at  least  four  reasons  for 
plurality importance: 
 
1.  Plurality ensures that no individual or corporation has excessive power in an 
industry which is central to the democratic process. 
 
2.  A plurality of owners should secure a plurality of sources of news and editorial 
opinion, which is vital given the position that newspapers and current affairs 
occupy  at  the  heart  of  public  debate.  A  healthy  democracy  depends  on  a   11 
culture of dissent and argument, which would inevitably be diminished if there 
were only a limited number of providers of news. 
 
3.  At the limit, even though a single source might produce impartial, high-quality 
content, they would be able to dictate exactly what constituted ￿news￿ itself, 
and their inclusion or omission of stories could slant the whole news agenda in 
a particular direction. 
 
4.  Plurality  maintains  our  cultural  vitality.  Different  media  companies  produce 
different styles of programming and publishing, which each have a different 
look  and  feel  to  them.  A  plurality  of  approaches  adds  to  the  breadth  and 
richness of our cultural experience. 
 
5. MEDIA CONCENTRATION 
 
Media  concentration  can  occur  in  a  number  of  different  ways  and  for  different 
reasons. Media companies can integrate both vertically and horizontally and through 
product  diversification  and  internationalisation  (this  occurs  through  mergers, 
acquisitions, take-overs, and cross-national market planning).  Presently, "traditional 
media"  (terrestrial  television,  publishing,  radio)  is  being  joined  by  forms  of  media 
resulting  from  new  technologies  coming  from  the  telecommunications  field (cable, 
satellite, telephony, internet, and consumer electronics companies).  
 
A  process  of  market  convergence  is  underway  as  broadcasting,  print  media  and 
communications  media  combine  services  through  mergers,  acquisitions  and 
alliances.  Newspapers,  radio  stations  and  cable  TV  stations  have  experienced 
substantial  consolidation  in  the  last  fifteen  years  and  have  become  highly 
concentrated. Network TV remains a concentrated market. The Internet has become 
more  concentrated  more  quickly  than  anyone  dreamed  when  measured  either  in 
terms of subscribership or usage. 
 




1.  Firstly,  mergers  often  mean  cost  cutting,  staff  lay-offs,  the  closing  down  of 
media  outlets  and  less  investment  in  content  through  which  editorial 
independence is jeopardized. Cost cutting usually leads to a standardization in 
media content, rather than diversification. This leads also to a reduction in the 
variation and amount of information sources.  
 
2.  A  second  concern  about  media  concentration  is  the  fact  that  large  market 
players can close the market to new entrants, independent producers or drive 
out weaker competitors. A market monopoly or oligopoly could be the result. 
This  situation  is  true  for  other  markets  but  considered  to  be  counter-
competitive for the media market as well as having social costs. Competition 
law can be used to prevent market concentration.  
 
3.  Media concentration may thirdly allow media owners an unwieldy heightened 
influence on public opinion (politically, economically and etc.) The media gives   12 
an owner potential power to influence public opinion in his favour and prevent 
counter views from reaching the general public. In principle, this could conform 
to the principles of freedom of speech. However, as concentration could lead 
to  only  this  voice  being  heard,  it  could  have  negative  consequences  for 
external and internal pluralism.  
 
4.  Fourthly, the increased use of encryption technologies in the delivery of media 
content threatens to financially burden the public with high costs for popular 
viewing. A high cost for access could be established by gateway monopolies. 
The  result  could  be  the  development  of  what  has  been  termed  as  the 
"information rich" and the "information poor".  
 
5.  Fifthly,  the  new  media  broadcast  channels  (particularly  cable  and  satellite 
television)  seek  to  identify  market  niches  to  boost  profitability.  This  often 
results in  specialized  channels  which tend to  be  thematic  and  narrow-cast. 
Minority audiences could be overlooked by such thematic channels (it could be 
the case that minority interests could also be served by these channels). 
 
5.1. MEASURING MARKET CONCENTRATION  
 
To  understand  how  market  concentration  is  measured,  we  can  use  the  U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Horizontal Merger Guidelines
7. The DOJ defines market 
levels of concentration to determine the extent of review of mergers. DOJ is unlikely 
to challenge mergers between companies in markets that are in unconcentrated. To 
make  this  assessment,  it  calculates  the  index  of  concentration  known  as  the 
Hirshman-Herfindahl index (HHI)
8. A measure of concentration of the production in 
an industry that's calculated as the sum of the squares of market shares for each 
firm. This is an alternative method of summarizing the degree to which an industry is 
oligopolistic and the relative concentration of market power held by the largest firms 
in  the  industry.  Another  way  to  quantify  market  concentration  is  to  calculate  the 
market share of the largest 4 firms (4 firm concentration ratio or CR4). 
 
The DOJ considers a market with an HHI of 1000 or less to be unconcentrated. Such 
a market would have the equivalent of ten equal sized competitors. In such a market, 
the 4-firm concentration ratio would be 40 percent. Any market with a concentration 
above  this  level  was  deemed  to  be  a  source  of  concern  and  increases  in 
concentration through mergers would receive scrutiny. 
 
The DOJ considers a market with an HHI of 1800 as the point where a market is 
considered highly concentrated. In terms of equal sized competitors, this level falls 
between five and six. A market with six equal sized competitors would have an HHI of 
1667. In such a market, the four firm concentration ratio would be 67. A market with 
                                                 
7 Section 4 of these Guidelines, relating to Efficiencies, was issued in revised form by the Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission on April 8, 1997; and the footnotes in Section 5 of the Guidelines have been 
renumbered accordingly. The remaining portions of the Guidelines were unchanged in 1997, and they were 
issued on April 2, 1992.  
8 The Herfindahl index gives a better indication of the relative market control of the largest firms than can be 
found with the four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios. 
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five equal sized competitors would have an HHI of 2000. The four firm concentration 
ratio would be 80 percent. 
 
Table 2: Describing market concentration for purposes of public policy 
 
DEPARTMENT OF         EQUIVALENTS IN                        HHI                                 4-
FIRM 
JUSTICE  MERGER                TERMS  OF  EQUAL                                                                
SHARE 
GUIDELINES                        SIZED FIRMS 
 
                                      5  EQUAL  SIZED  FIRMS                              HHI=  2000                           
CR4=80 
 
HIGHLY CONCENTRATED                                              HHI= 1800 OR MORE 
 
                                        6  EQUAL  SIZED  FIRMS                          HHI=  1667                           
CR4=67 
 




Sources:  U.S.  Department  of  Justice,  Horizontal  Merger  Guidelines,  revised 
April 8, 1997. 
 
 
Coopers (2001) stated that Shepherd describes these thresholds in terms of four-firm 
concentration ratios as follows: 
 
1.  Tight Oligopoly: The leading four firms combined have 60-100 percent of the 
market; collusion among them is relatively easy. 
 
2.  Loose Oligopoly: The leading four firms, combined, have 40 percent or less of 
the market; collusion among them to fix prices is virtually impossible. 
 
Sellers with market power
9 also may lessen competition on dimensions other than 
price,  such  as  product  quality,  service  or  innovation.  Because  of  the  critical 
importance of the media not only an economic marketplace, but as the cornerstone of 
the  marketplace  of  ideas,  we  believe  these  industries  should  be  held  to  close 
scrutiny. The critical level for scrutiny is the unconcentrated threshold (roughly the 
equivalent of 10 or more equal sized firms). 
                                                 
9 Market power to a seller is the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels for a significant 
period of time. In some circumstances, a sole seller (a "monopolist") of a product with no good substitutes can 
maintain a selling price that is above the level that would prevail if the market were competitive. Similarly, in 
some circumstances, where only a few firms account for most of the sales of a product, those firms can exercise 
market power, perhaps even approximating the performance of a monopolist, by either explicitly or implicitly 
coordinating their actions. In any case, the result of the exercise of market power is a transfer of wealth from 
buyers to sellers or a misallocation of resources. 
   14 
 
In this point, we can look at media market concentration level in USA. 
 
Table 3: Concentration on some media market 
 
MARKET  AND  PERIOD  OF  MOST  RECENT  DATA                                  LEVEL  OF 
CONCENTRATION  
Internet (2000) 
Subscribers                2500 
Viewing Time                           1200 
Television (mid-1990s) 
Local Viewing - Advertising 
Largest Fifth              1600 - 700 
2nd Fifth              2000 - 1600 
3rd Fifth               2100 - 2300 
4th Fifth               2700 - 2300 
Smallest Fifth               2500  - 
3100 
National 
Viewing               1100 
Advertising               1700 
Cable Subscribers (1999) 
FCC - MPVD 
w/o Attribution of AT&T Ownership                   1000 
w/ Attribution               1400 
Cable only 
w/o Attribution of AT&T Ownership                   1900 
w/ Attribution               2500 
Radio Local Share (1997)              1600 - 2100 
Newspapers Circulation (1999)                          6000 
Source: Cooper 2001 
 
Coopers  (2001)  analyze  this  table  as  follow:  Market  structure  analysis  must  be 
grounded on the actual market shares, not merely the number of participants and the 
rapidly  increasing  concentration  of  the  Internet  underscored  that  point.  The 
increasing concentration of the internet is stunning (table 3). AOL￿s dominance of 
subscribership in the U.S. is widely noted (30 million subscribers, putting its market 
share  above  50  percent).  Its  market  share  makes  it  a  leading  firm  in  a  highly 
concentrated market. Even more striking is the growth in the concentration of usage. 
 
Because  the  number  of  potential  online  channels  is  infinite,  some  assume  that 
market  dominance  is  an  impossibility  on  the  Internet.  This  is  faulty  reasoning. 
Gauging consolidation online simply requires a different measuring stick than it does 
off-line.  Analysis  of  Media  Metrix  data  over  the  past  three  years  shows  an 
incontrovertible trend toward online media consolidatio. Between March 1999 and 
March 2001, the total number of companies controlling 50 percent of user minutes 
online decreased by nearly two-thirds, from 11 to four.58 
 
Because AOL has such a dominant position (over 30 percent of user time) the HHI is 
about  1200,  well  above  the  moderately  concentrated  threshold.  The  four  firm   15 
concentration ratio also falls in the range where concerns about concentration and 
the abuse of market power begin. 
 
Most  local  distribution  markets  for  network  TV  are  highly  concentrated  measured 
either in terms of viewers or advertising dollars. HHIs are well above 1800 and four 
firm  concentration  ratios  are  well  above  sixty  percent  in  all  but  the  very  largest 
markets. The national market for viewers (HHI=1000) and advertising (HHI=1600) is 
moderately concentrated. 
 
Although the FCC claims that the cable TV market falls just below the level of being 
moderately concentrated (HHI = 954), it arrives at this conclusion by ignoring AT&T￿s 
substantial  ownership  interests  in  Cablevision  and  AOL  Time  Warner  and  by 
including satellite in the same product space, even though it could not find significant 
cross-price elasticity between cable and satellite. Defining the market correctly as 
cable only and taking AT&T￿s ownership interests into account places the cable TV 
market  into  the  highly  concentrated  category.  The  recent  wave  of  mergers  has 
moved local radio markets into the highly concentrated range, with HHIs averaging 
above  2000.  Newspapers  have  long  been  highly  concentrated,  with  HHIs  above 
6000. 
 
5.2. SOME OWNERSHIP DATA  
 
In this section, we can look at results of the studies of Djankov, McLeish, Nenova and 
Shleifer (2001) which is related to ownership structure of media in all over the world. 
Because of the aim of the our essay, we do not give place to such as construction of 
database, variable construction.   
 





Employees  Widely Held  Other 
Press  Ownership,  by  Count 
(%) 
29  57  4  4  6 
Press  Ownership,  by  Share 
(%) 
29  59  4  3  5 
TV Ownership, by Count (%)  34  60  0  5  1 
TV Ownership, by Share (%)  29  64  1  5  1 
Source: Djankov, McLeish, Nenova and Shleifer (2001) 
 
Their first significant finding is that families and the state own the media throughout 
the world. In the sample of 97 countries, only 4% of media enterprises are widely 
held. Less than 2% have other ownership structures, and a mere 2% are employee 
owned. On average, family controlled newspapers account for 57% of the total, and 
family controlled television stations for 34% of the total.  
 
State ownership is also vast. On average, the state controls approximately 29% of 
newspapers and 60% of television stations. The state owns a huge share ￿ 72% - of 
the top radio stations. Based on these findings, for the remaining analysis we classify 
ownership into 3 categories: state, private (which is the sum of family, widely held 
and employee categories), and other. 
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This  result  is  consistent  with  the  Demsetz  (1989)  insight  that  the  large  amenity 
potential of ownership media outlets creates competitive pressures toward ownership 
concentration.  In  a  sense,  both  the  governments  and  the  controlling  private 
shareholders  get  the  same  benefit  from  controlling  media  outlets:  the  ability  to 
influence public opinion and the political process. 
 
They  say  that  the  state  has  a  monopoly  in  a  media  market  if  the  share  of  state 
controlled firms exceeds 75%. A total of 21 countries have government monopolies of 
daily newspapers, and 43 countries have state monopolies of television stations with 
local  news.  Television  has  significantly  higher  levels  of  state  ownership  than 
newspapers.  
 
Alternatively, from the political perspective, privately owned newspapers are easier to 
censor than privately owned TV. Because television can be broadcast live, control of 
content is more likely to require ownership. In this case, governments that want to 
censor news would own television. 
 
The simple statistics presented so far raise many questions. The evidence suggests 
that there are large private benefits of media ownership. Throughout the world, media 





6. MEDIA (OWNERSHIP) REGULATION 
 
As  has  mentioned  in  section  4,  diversity  and  plurality  will  be  used  to  refer  both 
different content and services and different media owners. However, it is difficult to 
measure diversity and plurality, especially the diversity of content. According to the 
Council of Europe (CeO 2002:4), critical threshold is one-third of the market in terms 
of revenues, audiences or network capacity. This means that, for the diversity aim, 
there must be at least four owner in the market. In the same way, in the proposal of 
DG XV in 1996 for a ￿Media Pluralism Directive￿, 30 percent upper limit for single 
medium and 10 percent upper limit in the overall media was adopted (Doyle,1997). 
However, these thresholds of media ownership are only related to the structure of 
market and they do not guarantee diversity of content (CoE 1999).  
 
Because of that, media ownership rules are not sufficient to ensure the diversity, so, 
￿measures over and above those that solely focus on restrictions to ownership may 
be  needed￿    (CoE  1999).  These  measures  can  be  imposing  content  obligations, 
ensuring access to ￿bottleneck￿ proponents and applying competition law.    
 
Two  broad  areas  of  regulation  are  involved  in  controlling  media  ownership:  more 
specific rules set out in sectoral law (especially at broadcasting) and competition law 
(Research, 2002). 
 
-  Sectoral  law  imposes  additional  controls  on  the  scale  of  a  company￿s  media 
interests. These controls operate at a number of levels. Some persons are wholly 
prohibited from holding any broadcasting licences, or are prohibited from holding 
certain types of licence. Further, within individual media sectors  there are limits   17 
on the scale of interests that a person may have within that sector. Finally, there 
are  controls  which  apply  across  different  types  of  media  (such  as  running  a 
national newspaper and holding a broadcasting licence) which are designed to 
prevent a person accumulating too great a share of the media voice. These rules 
are detailed and complex.  
 
-  Competition law applies to all sectors of the economy, and addresses the creation 
of concentrations of business operations (through merger controls
10), the abuse of 
monopoly power and anti-competitive cartels.  
 
The terrestrial television and daily newspaper markets, which commonly enjoy a wide 
audience  reach,  are  targeted  as  particularly
  salient  for  ensuring  pluralistic  (and
 
democratic) representation. It is therefore necessary for the government to continue 
regulating ￿ either through structural constraints like ownership caps, or behavioral 
requirements  like ￿equal  time,￿  ￿reasonable access,￿  or  network/affiliate rules  ￿  to 
pursue the public interest goals of meeting local community needs and promoting 




According  to  Cooper  (2001a),  in  media  sector,  public  policy  is  most  critically 
important now for two reason.  
 
-  First, the new interactive, multi-media hold the potential to increase the power of 
the TV medium and expand its role in commerce and political expression.  
 
-  Second,  it  is  critical  to  ensure  public  values  are  reflected  in  the  underlying 
infrastructure of the media marketplace at the early stages, as the networks are 
being designed and deployed. Economic and contractual relations create barriers 
to access and give owners control, and, perhaps more importantly, architectural 
decisions  in  the  design  of  networks  place  speakers  and  non-owners  at  a 
disadvantage. 
 
There are many dimensions and rational about regulation of  media in literature
12. 
Countries have developed a template identifying the key policy instruments used in 
regulating media sector (Harcourt ve Verhulst, 1998):  
                                                 
10 In UK, within the merger control regime, special procedures currently exist for mergers of larger-circulation 
newspapers. These create a presumption of detailed scrutiny for newspaper mergers which must be notified to 
the competition authorities before they are completed. In contrast, other mergers are only scrutinised if they are 
thought to raise specific competition concerns.  
11 Consumers Union in USA believes the FCC should leave the current national television broadcast ownership 
cap in place, while it initiates a much more detailed and extensive analysis of market structure than it has in the 
past.  However, when the two largest sources of news and information ￿ television and newspaper come under 
the same ownership roof, there is special cause for concern about business pressures that could undermine the 
free marketplace of ideas. 
 
Moreover, Consumers Union also believes that, particularly where there is only one local newspaper, the public 
interest is best served by prohibiting that newspaper from owning a local television broadcast outlet. Dangers 
ranging from favorable newspaper reviews of a broadcaster￿s programming, to positive editorials/opinion articles 
about business interests of a broadcaster or politicians who favor such business interests would be difficult to 
prevent if cross-ownership is broadly permitted: 
 
12 See for details Golderberg at al (1998).   18 
 
A.  Basic constitutional rights relating to freedom of speech  
B.   Legislation ensuring transparency of media holdings 
1.  Requirements to name company owners/shareholders (nominative 
shares)  
2.  Requirements
 to disclose company accounts  
3.  Requirements to disclose sources of media revenue  
4.  Requirements to notify regulatory authorities of significant changes in 
stock, capital or shareholdings  
C. Legislation concerning media ownership 
1.  General ownership and management rules e.g. licensing requirements, 
representation of social groups at general board  
2.  Cross Media Ownership regulations  
3.  Foreign ownership/investment rules  
 
D.  Legislation ensuring access (e.g. distribution platform, interconnection, 
essential facilities)  
E.  Competition Law (and the way it is applicable to the media)  
1.  Cartel, merger and acquisition regulation 
2.  Measurements and methodology to determine dominance  
 
D.  State support and subsidising of media companies  
 
E.  Advertising rules/restriction  
 
F.  Protection rules of editorial/journalistic independence and accountability  
 
G. Content related legislation/provisions  
1.  Impartiality of news coverage  
2.  Public Interest Provisions (regional programming, representation of societal 
groups, etc.)  
3.  Programming rights and listed events  
 
H.  Powers of regulatory bodies in the field of media ownership and concentration  
K. Future regulatory proposals and trends 
 
As  mentioned  above,  countries  have  developed  a  variety  of  policy  instruments 
directly governing media sector. Media sector has been regulated by sector specific 
rules to achieve social and political aims like preserving cultural identity, maintaining 
diversity and pluralism, protecting minors, privacy and freedom of speech. However, 
the  main  concern  is  to  prevent  control  of  media  by  one  or  few  person.  Much 
regulation  is  aimed  at  limiting  excessive  concentration  in  media  markets.  The 
importance  of  controlling  excessive  cross-media  ownership  between  these  two 
markets has been also a source of regulation  
 
In order to ensure diversity and pluralism in the media, there are special restrictions 
on  the  concentration.  Ownership  rules  and  restrictions,  e.g.  cross-ownership   19 
restrictions,  restrictions  on  number  of  licences,  foreign  ownership  and  share  of 
individuals and legal persons in media companies
13 are one of the important tools for 
ensuring diversity and pluralism in  most of  the countries. We can summarize key 
policy instruments used to control media market concentration and those effecting 
ownership in media markets such as (Harcourt ve Verhulst, 1998):  
 
1.  general competition law and specific provisions under competition law directed 
towards the media.  
2.  Regulating media and telecommunications operators through licensing of national 
services  
3.  Requiring the promotion of media pluralism as a pre-requisite to licence-issuing.  
4.  lowering  entry  barriers  to  markets  through  legal  decisions  and  economic 
incentives (tax relief, financial assistance)  
5.  promoting  media  which  are  seen  to  provide
  diversity  of  content  or  represent 
minority views
  
6.  providing financial assistance to content providers providing a variety of content  
7.  guaranteeing the high quality and availability of public service broadcasting (by 
instituting "must carry" rules on cable, satellite and digital providers  
8.  adopting legal instruments to safeguard editorial independence and freedom of 
expression  
9.  requiring high transparency of company reports and activities  
10. monitoring  ownership  patterns  in  media  markets  and  making  this  information 
publicly available.  
11. ensuring open networks and universal service for internet users  
12. To prevent gateway monopolies of new services. 
 
 
In recent years, with the economic and technological changes, necessity of media 
ownership  rules  has  begun  to  be  questioned.  In  this  context,  governments  try  to 
balance  two  objectives  when  deciding  their  media  ownership  rules:  maintaining 
diversity and other public policy aims on the one hand, and ensuring dynamic and 
competitive media markets on the other hand (UK, 2001; Scheuer and Stroatmann 
2002).  In this context, there is a debate on whether competition law and policy itself 
is sufficient to ensure diversity and pluralism.  
 
 
7. COMPETION LAW AND MEDIA CONCENTRATION
14   
 
As stated above, competition law and policy is one of the tool to regulation of media. 
With  the  increasing  commercial  activities  and  concentrations  in  recent  years, 
adequacy of competition law and policy itself to provide for diversity  and pluralism 
has  been  questioned.  In  that  debate,  while  some  argue  that  competition  law  is 
sufficient  to  ensure  diversity  and  pluralism  so  there  is  no  need  for  specific 
regulations,  some  argue  that  competition  law  and  policy  is  an  essential  tool  in 
regulating media but it cannot sufficiently deal with diversity concerns (Scheuer and 
Stroatmann  2002).  In  other  words,  some  believe  that  specific  regulation  like 
                                                 
13 See CoE (2002) and UK (2001) for the media ownership rules of different countries.  
14 I would like to thank my colleague, Competition Expert Mr. Ali Demir￿z who has contribution to this chapter 
by sharing his unprinted essay " To what extent is european competition law and policy sufficient to provide for 
diversity in the broadcast media? " which was submitted at Essex University.   20 
ownership rules  are essential  to  provide  for  diversity in  media  sector.  It  could  be 






7.1. Competition Law and Media 
 
Competition  or  antitrust  laws  are  enacted  by  states  around  the  world  in  order  to 
provide  that  market  mechanism  works  properly.  So,  it  could  be  stated  that  main 
objective of the competition law and policy is to achieve ￿effective competition￿ in the 
market (Sufrin and Jones 2001). If there is effective competition in the markets, it is 
assumed that productive, allocative and innovative efficiency will be ensured. 
   
It is not possible to examine every aspect of competition law and policy, so, some 
important  points  which  are  relevant  to  media  will  be  examined  below.  Generally, 
competition law and policy has three main tools: 
 
7.1.1. Agreements Between Undertakings  
 
Like  Turkish  Competition  Law  Article  4  and  EC  Treaty  Article  81,  generally  all 
competition law prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, 
and decisions of associations of undertakings, which prevent or distort competition in 
the market. Agreements to fix prices, share markets and limit production are some of 
the examples prohibited by these articles
16.  
 
If there were no tool to deal with cartels and agreement, media company could easily 
coordinate their behaviours. Because of that, these articles serves to diversity and 




17 Case, Turkish Competition Authority took the decisions as follows:  
When the information received from the parties during the stage of investigation is 
examined, whereas both BBD and YAYSAT abolished all current contracts concluded 
by  the  customer  publishing  houses  as  of  01.06.1996,  and  declared  that  they 
assigned  these  contracts  to  BIRYAY,  the  customer  publishing  houses  concluded 
contracts with BIRYAY on 01.06.1996 which generally involved heavier conditions 
compared with the precedents such as  higher rates for distribution commissions and 
compensation figures, some of the customer publishing houses resisted to sign these 
contracts, and BIRYAY requested from BBD and YAYSAT to cease the distribution of 
publications of publishing houses which had not signed a distribution contract with it, 
it  is  understood  that  BBD  and  YAYSAT  eliminated  competition  in  the  market  by 
means of transferring to BIRYAY the customer publications in hand, partitioning the 
distribution  market  for  newspapers  and  journals  and  making  BIRYAY  the  only 
addressee for the customer publishing houses. 
                                                 
15 See, among others, Gibbons (1999), CoE (2002), UK (2001).   
16 However, some agreements can be exempted from this prohibition if the agreement in question satisfies the 
conditions set out in related articles.  
17 BIRYAY is the joint venture of BBD and YAYSAT equally owns.   21 
After commencing operation, BIRYAY apportioned between BBD and YAYSAT the 
distribution  of  publications  belonging  to  the  customer  publishing  houses  which 
concluded a distribution contract with it. Therefore, besides the partitioning of market, 
customers are also partitioned via BIRYAY.  
It is also evidenced in documents that BBD and YAYSAT made correspondences via 
BIRYAY and determined the fixed prices and commission rates to be received from 
the customer publishing houses. 
When the above statements and the determinations and documents in the findings 
section of the decision are considered, the opinion reached is that BBD and YAYSAT 
infringed article 4 of the Act by both 
-  partitioning the distribution market for newspapers and journals and 
customer publications via BIRYAY jointly set up by them, and 
 
-  determining jointly the amount of fixed prices and the distribution 
commissions to be received from the customer publishing houses via the 
Main Contract of BIRYAY and correspondences through BIRYAY. 
 
Subsidiary  dealership  contracts  concluded  by  YAYSAT  and  BBD  involve  anti-
competitive provisions as they grant an exclusive region for one of the parties and 
restrict  the  freedom  of  the  subsidiary  dealer  for  resale  and  to  display  and  sell 
competing goods, and therefore they are contrary to article 4 of the Act. 
 
In BiB Case
18, a joint venture between BskyB, British Telecom (BT), Midland Bank 
and Matsushita Electric Europe was assessed under Article 81 of EC Treaty. The 
joint venture established to provide digital interactive television services. Although BT 
and  BskyB  were  potential  competitors  in  that  market  and  there  were  restrictive 
clauses  in  the  agreement,  Commission  granted  exemption  by  imposing  some 
conditions on parties (Nitsche 2001). This case is important that, on the one hand, it 
shows Commission￿s ￿permissive approach￿ in the case of a new service (Nitsche 
2001),  on  the  other  hand  Commission  intervenes  the  agreement  by  imposing 
conditions on parties to preserve competition. These conditions aim to prevent the 
foreclosure of market by parties. 
 
In  the  context  of  Article  81,  collective  selling  and  purchasing  of  content  rights 
especially broadcasting sports events can be anticompetitive.  Monti (2002) states 
that collective selling of sports rights can distort competition, if they are sold for ￿long 
duration￿ and ￿exclusively￿. He also stresses the Commission￿s will ￿to ensure that any 
withholding of rights does not hinder the emergence of new technologies￿. Similar 
approach  also  were  accepted  by  Turkish  Competition  Authority  (TCA).  In  other 
words,  TCA  stated  that  Turkish  Football  Fedaration  was  an  undertaking  so  its 
agreement between broadcaster (Cine 5, Teleon and Digit￿rk) was also under scope 
of Competition Law of 4054.  
 
It can be concluded that these article is directly or indirectly serving to the diversity 
and  plurality  by  preventing  anticompetitive  agreements  and  by  exempting  pro-
competitive agreements. 
                                                 
18 Bib+4 Comp/36.539, OJ L 312/1-37, 06.12.1999.     22 
 
 
7.1.2. Abuse of Dominant Position  
 
Like  Turkish  Competition  Law  Article  6  and  EC  Treaty  Article  82,  generally  all 
competition  law  prohibits  the  abuse  of  dominant  positions  of  one  or  more 
undertakings.  Excessive  or  predatory  pricing,  discrimination, leveraging,  and  tying 
are the examples of these articles. 
 
One of the claims about the inadequacy of competition law is related to concept of 
abuse of dominant position. According to this claim while competition law can prohibit 
the external growth of a company (like mergers), it cannot prohibit the internal growth 
by which a company can have a dominant position in the market (Gibbons 1999; 
Scheuer and Stroatmann 2002).  
 
On the other hand, when deciding the dominant position of an undertaking (like a 
broadcaster), Competition Authorities takes into account different factors like market 
shares,  barriers  to  entry,  and  number  of  competitors.  In  practice,  40-50  per  cent 
market share is critical to decide dominant position and below 40 per cent level it is 
difficult to find a dominant position (Jones and Sufrin 2001). This means that ￿special 
responsibilities￿ imposed to undertakings holding dominant position will apply above 
certain thresholds (at least 40 per cent) that these thresholds are above the diversity 
thresholds.  
 
Because  that  competition  law  does  not  intervene  undertakings  holding  dominant 
position in the market unless they abuse their positions, plurality aim will be at stake. 
For example, considering the plurality criteria (25 per cent upper limit for one medium 
in  RTUK  Law),  there  is  a  need  for  restriction  of  ownership  when  undertaking 
achieved more than 25 per cent market share even in the case of internal growth or 
success.  In  other  words,  the  very  rational  rule of  competition law  and  economics 
conflict with the aim of diversity and plurality  in the broadcast media. 
 
Another critic relates to abuse of dominant position is that it is not an adequate tool to 
remedy  access  issues  (Scheuer  and  Stroatmann,  2002).  Access  issues  are  very 
important particularly in the convergent environment of media (Perreira, 2002). As 
mentioned above, access to technologies, standards and transmission channels are 
very important in the broadcasting sector. One who controls these ￿bottlenecks￿ can 
lever this power in other markets. It is argued that judgement of European Court of 
Justice  in  Bronner  Case
19  requires  strict  criteria  for  the  application  of  ￿essential 
facilities doctrine￿ that gives third parties to access to an essential facility (Scheuer 
and  Stroatmann,  2002).  Because  of  that,  proponents  of  sector  specific  regulation 
claim  that  specific  rules  are  essential  to  ensure  access  to  bottlenecks  especially 
access to transmission channels.     
 
However,  prohibition  of  abuse  of  dominant  position  has  strengths  that  specific 
regulation cannot address. First of all, it can control oligopolies by applying Article 82 
of EC Treaty to collective dominance of media company (Scheuer and Stroatmann, 
2002). Because that media markets are ￿prone to oligopoly￿ (Doyle, 2002), this tool is 
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Jones and Sufrin (2001) for the comments about the case.    23 
very important to prevent media company from behaving like a monopolist. Secondly, 
Commission  tend  to  define  narrow  markets,  thus  it  can  address  problems  in  all 
markets  in  the  supply  chain.  So,  competition  law  can  prevent  abuse  of  dominant 
position held in the every stage of media market
20. It also prevents leverage of this 
dominant position to other markets.     
 
Like Commission￿s applications, Turkish Competition Authority also investigated the 
media  company￿s  abusive  behoviour.  Such  as  in  BIRYAY  case,  Competition 
Authority  reached  the  determination  of  and  grounds  for  the  abuse  of  dominant 
position under article 6 of the Act:  
 
During  the  conducts  which  are  the  subject  of  investigation,  YAYSAT,  BBD  and 
BIRYAY's total market shares for the last five years reach 100  percent. Therefore, 
the relevant product market is of an oligopolistic and even a duopolistic nature  when 
it is considered that BIRYAY is a joint venture of YAYSAT and BBD groups. 
It  is  rather  less  likely  that  new  companies  enter  into  a  market  without  much 
perspective  for  development  and  expansion  such  as  the  distribution  market  for 
newspapers  and  journals  in  Turkey,  which  is  the  subject  of  investigation,  and 
therefore  it  is  assumed  that  the  companies  in  these  markets  shall  maintain  the 
market shares already hold by them. That the market shares on the date of signing 
the foundation agreement of BIRYAY (14.05.1996) and during the subsequent years 
did not change too much in terms of the joint venture and competing companies is 
indicative of the fact that balance of powers is somewhat maintained. 
Competition  in  the  market  is  considerably  restricted  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
distribution market for newspapers and journals in Turkey was a quite busy market 
before  the  foundation  of  BIRYAY,  there  were  only  two  firms  which  could  actually 
distribute customer publications, and these two firms which were competitors set up a 
joint venture and made it compulsory to distribute customer publications via this joint 
venture. 
That following the foundation of BIRYAY, price and commission rates for the firms 
(customer publishing houses) transferred to here by both distribution companies are 
determined by the agreement of both distribution companies, that in article 39 of the 
foundation contract of BIRYAY entitled "tariffs to be applied", tariffs to be applied for 
newspapers  and  journals  are  decided  and  prices  are  already  set  at  the  founding 
stage, that after the founding stage prices to be applied for new customer publishing 
houses are set by the agreement of both companies, that joint dealers exist, and that 
joint decision is taken not to make these dealers sell products from other distribution 
channels show that BBD, BIRYAY and YAYSAT act together in several matters. 
It is rather less likely for a new undertaking to enter the market due to the fact that 
there is a very high rate of concentration in the said market and there are not any 
firms  capable  of  competing  with  these  two  companies  after  concentration,  that 
establishing a distribution company is costly, that it is not possible to enter the current 
networks  of  dealers,  and  that  there  is  inability  to  reach  enough  number  of 
publications  to  feed  the  new  network  of  dealership  to  be  set  up.  As  customer 
                                                 
20 However, it is argued that a narrow relevant market defined by  economic concerns may not address the 
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publishing  houses  do not  have  any  alternatives  other than distribution  companies 
jointly  set  up  by  firms  with  which  they  compete  in  the  upper  market  (publishing 
market for newspapers and journals), their bargaining power is very low. Therefore, 
the price elasticity of demand is very low. 
When the above statements are considered together, it is understood that YAYSAT, 
BBD  and  BIRYAY  are  jointly  in  dominant  position  in  the  distribution  market  for 
newspapers and journals.  
When the determinations in the findings section are examined; 
It is seen that publishing houses resist to conclude contracts with BIRYAY, or try to 
erase, cross out compensation figures which take place in the contracts they signed 
and which are important for BIRYAY. On the other hand, in order to ensure that these 
publishing houses "prefer" itself, BIRYAY requests from BBD and YAYSAT "to cease 
the  distribution  of  publications  of  publishing  houses  and  not  to  make  payment  to 
these publishing houses".  
It is understood that BBD and YAYSAT which have a joint dominant position in the 
distribution  market  for  newspapers  and  journals  set  up  BIRYAY  so  that  they  can 
distribute  "customer  publications"  i.e.  publications  which  may  compete  with  those 
issued by their own group under different conditions than publications belonging to 
their own group and force customer publishing houses to conclude contracts with 
BIRYAY, that publishing houses which do not wish to sign contracts with BIRYAY are 
exposed to the risk of not having their publications distributed and not receiving their 
payment, and therefore the risk of the prevention of their activities in the publishing 
market for newspapers and journals, that their activities in the publishing market for 
newspapers and journals are made difficult due to new commission rates and they 
are placed at a competitive disadvantage because of the intra-group publications of 
BBD and YAYSAT, that certain publications are tried to be pushed out of the market, 
thereby  distorting  the  conditions  of  competition  in  the  publishing  market  for 
newspapers and journals. 
It  is  observed  that    the  distribution  contract  between  ￿zg￿n  Medya  A.S.  (￿zg￿n 
Media Inc.) publishing the Newspaper Siyah Beyaz and BBD was abolished by the 
formation  of  BIRYAY  and  a  new  contract  was  tried  to  be  signed  which  involved 
aggravated provisions in terms of new commission rates, that the publishing house 
which  did  not  want  to  sign  the  said  contract  with  BIRYAY  wished  to  deliver  its 
publications to BBD under the previous contract with BBD but BBD did not accept 
these publications, that eventually the publishing house had to sign a contract with 
BIRYAY,  however  BIRYAY  did  not  renew  the  contract  after  its  expiration  without 
indicating any grounds and rendered difficult the activities of the newspaper in the 
publishing market for newspapers and journals, and that the newspaper was pushed 
out of the market.   
It is understood that following the foundation of BIRYAY, the activities of Uluslararas￿ 
Moda  Yayincilik  A.S.  (International  Moda  Publishing  Inc.),  Universal  Yayincilik  ve 
Ticaret  A.S.  (Universal  Publishing  and  Trade  Inc.)  and  Novamedya  Tan￿t￿m  ve 
Yayincilik Ticaret A.S. (Novamedya Publicity and Publishing Trade Inc.) which did not 
want  to  conclude  contracts  with  BIRYAY  under  more  different  conditions  were   25 
rendered difficult, and that the introduction of publications of these publishing houses 
which later accepted the contract terms of BIRYAY was delayed. 
Notary minutes obtained are noteworthy, which concern the fact that the display and 
sale  of  the  newspaper  Ak”am  and  other  publications  in  the  same  group  at 
newsdealers are prevented or made difficult by BBD, YAYSAT and BIRYAY, and that 
dealership is offered in return for not selling the Newspaper Ak”am. That the said 
minutes  show  similarities  although  they  have  been  kept  recently  by  numerous 
dealers  in  a  wide  variety  of  settlements  in  Turkey  gives  the  impression  that  the 
practices are not individual cases. 
It  is  thought  that  the  above  practices  fit  in  actions  aiming  at  the  distortion  of 
competition in another market in the context of article 6 of the Act. 
 
7.1.3.Mergers   
 
Competition Laws generally prohibits mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures with if 
they  create  or  strengthen  a  dominant  position  as  a  result  of  which  effective 
competition would be significantly impeded in the market.    
 
Like EC merger control regime, Turkish Competition Law Article 7 and Merger and 
Acquisations Communique No. 1997/1 are important tools to address diversity issues 
because it considers directly the number of players in the market. Its importance has 
increased  in  recent  years  with  the  waves  of  mergers  and  joint  ventures  (JVs) 
between converging sectors. Both Turkish and Commission merger regime sets out 
so-called  ￿dominance  test￿  to  assess  the  concentrations  (merger,  acquisitions  and 
JVs). According to this test, if a concentration ￿creates or strengthens a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in 
the common market￿, this merger will be prohibited. However, again, this criterion of 
merger control causes critics that it cannot adequately address diversity (Scheuer 
and Stroatmann, 2002).  
 
As mentioned above, criteria of finding dominant position conflict with the diversity 
criteria.  Both  Turkish  and  Commission  merger  regime￿s  main  concern  in  merger 
cases is to prevent creation and accumulation of a dominant position. Furthermore, if 
there is a risk for collective dominance, Commission can intervene a merger causing 
oligopolistic dominance in the market.  
   
As has stated before, concentrations particularly JVs between parties who are in the 
different stages of value chain in broadcasting sector have increased. In these cases, 
Commission￿s  concerns  are  focused  on  foreclosure  of  markets  and  access  to 
bottlenecks. For example, in MSG Media Services
21, Commission prohibited the JV, 
which was established by Kirch group, Bertelsman and Deutsche Telecom to provide 
Pay-TV and related services in Germany, ￿because the joint strength of two major 
private  broadcasters,  together  with  telecom  expertise,  would  make  further  market 
entry  impossible  and  deprive  consumers  of  the  benefits  of  competition  between 
different Pay-TV suppliers￿ (Nitchse, 2001). Because of the flexibility of competition 
law in defining market definition, Commission defined Pay-TV market separately and 
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prohibited  merger.  This  shows  strength  of  EC  competition  law  that  it  can  control 
strategic alliances in new markets, which can escape the national media regulation 
rules to ensure media diversity (Levy, 1999). 
 
Commission￿s merger policy especially in the light of convergence is to balance two 
conflicting  aims:  encouraging  investment  in  the  new  markets  by  permitting 
transactions on the one hand, ensuring competition by imposing strict conditions to 
access to bottlenecks on the other hand (Perreira, 2002).  
 
Different  from  the  Turkish  merger  control  regime,  Commission￿s  Article  21(3)  of 
merger  regime  sets  out  an  exception  to  the  so-called  ￿one-stop-shop  rule￿  that 
￿member  states  may  take  appropriate  measures  to  protect  legitimate  interests￿. 
Plurality of media has been counted as one of the legitimate interests of member 
sates  in  Article  21(3).  It  means  that  if  approved  merger  has  negative  effects  on 
plurality in media in one member state, this member may take appropriate measures 
in  its  territory.  However,  Article  21(3)  does  not  require  Commission  to  consider 
plurality of media in its analysis and so far no member states has invoked this rule 
(Nitsche, 2001). It is argued that this rule indicates the inadequacy of EC competition 
law to provide diversity (Scheuer and Stroatmann, 2002).   
 
It can be concluded that although merger control aims to achieve economic goals 
and takes into account economic criteria, its contribution to the diversity especially by 
addressing problems of vertical integration and access issues in the new markets 




7.2. Adequacy of competition Law 
 
The  prevailing  orthodoxy  is  that  competitive  forces,  supplemented  by  competition 
law, are the most desirable way of ensuring that markets work well and efficiently for 
business  and  consumers.  Under  this  view,  the  opposite  pole  of  competition  is 
regulation,  which  is  seen  as  an  alternative  or  supplementary  force  to  control  the 
workings  of  uncompetitive  or  immature  markets  so  as  to  prevent  undesirable 
outcomes.  As  those  markets  are  opened  up  to  competition,  or  mature,  then  the 
expectation is that regulatory controls will give way to ordinary competition controls.  
 
There are those who argue that competition law would be sufficient in itself to control 
the  newspaper  and  broadcasting  sector,  and  that  special  controls  on  media 
ownership are unnecessary. However, many governments have rejected this policy, 
arguing that while competition controls have a role in delivering an efficient media 
which also reflects the expectations of democratic society, they cannot on their own 
guarantee core features of the media.  
 
In order to achieve effective competition objective by using tools mentioned above, 
competition  law  and  policy  mainly  takes  into  account  economic  concerns  and 
competition.  Because it  focuses  on  economic  aims  other  than  those  public  policy 
aims  like diversity in  broadcast  media,  proponents  of  specific regulation in  media 
claim that competition law itself is not sufficient to achieve diversity. For example, in   27 
the UK Government￿s Consultation Paper on Media Ownership Rules (UK, 2001), 
this view is clearly expressed as: 
 
￿￿  although  competition  law  is  an  important  part  of  regulation,  it  is  not 
designed to deliver diversity and plurality in the media. Competition rules can 
address  issues  of  concentration,  efficiency,  and  choice,  and  will  tend  to 
encourage  dispersed  ownership  and  new  entry.  ￿Competition  law  cannot 
therefore provide the certainty we need that a significant number of different 
media voices, will continue to be heard, or that prospective new entrants to the 
market will be able to add their voice.￿ 
 
Competition law as a general framework for all sectors of economy cannot normally 
address the all specific needs of the sectors like the diversity and pluralism in the 
media.  Competition  law  cannot  therefore  provide  the  certainty  we  need  that  a 
significant  number  of  different  media  voices  will  continue  to  be  heard,  or  that 
prospective new entrants to the market will be able to add their voice. Moreover, it 
cannot directly address concerns over editorial freedom or community voice. 
 
Therefore, it can be stated that with its objectives, tools and criteria, competition law 
and policy itself is not completely sufficient to provide for diversity in the broadcast 













After  1990s,  technological  and  economic  developments  have  evolved  the  media 
sector by converging it to telecommunications and IT sectors and by leading to new 
interactive  broadcasting  services  transmitted  by  different  technologies.  These 
developments  also  increased  mergers  and  joint  ventures  both  at  global  level  and 
national level. Increasing concentrations in this process caused many concerns about 
diversity and plurality in the media.    
 
There  are  many  people  which  argue  that  concentration  in  media  markets  has  a 
negative  effect  on  diversity  and  plurality.  Greater  concentration  results  in  less 
diversity, while diversity of ownership across geographic, ethnic and gender lines is 
associated with diversity of programming. The dictates of mass audiences create a 
largest market share/lowest common denominator ethic that undercuts that ability to 
deliver diverse, locally-oriented and public interest programming (Cooper, 2001a) 
 
Although  competition  law  is  an  important  part  of  regulation,  it  is  not  designed  to 
deliver diversity and plurality in the media. Competition rules can address issues of 
concentration, efficiency and choice, and will tend to encourage dispersed ownership   28 
and new entry. However, they cannot guarantee any of it. Competition law cannot 
therefore provide the certainty we need that a significant number of different media 
voices will continue to be heard, or that prospective new entrants to the market will 
be  able  to  add  their  voice.  Moreover,  it  cannot  directly  address  concerns  over 
editorial freedom or community voice  
 
Therefore, if competition law and policy is assessed as a whole in the context of 
media, it can be stated that it guarantees diversity to some extent. However, because 
of the objectives and criteria of competition law, it cannot adequately ensure diversity 
and plurality itself. As Monti (2001) accepted, in some cases, competition law is not 
sufficient to address diversity concerns if a concentration does not raise competition 
concerns. This problem stems from the conflict of economic rationale and diversity 
and plurality concerns in the media. Because, competition law takes in to account the 
economic criteria, which are partly different from diversity criteria, its sufficiency to 
ensure  diversity  remains  limited.  Therefore,  it  can  be  concluded  that  although 
competition law and policy is very important in media sector, it cannot completely 
provide for diversity and plurality.       
 
The Government￿s task is to find a middle ground that safeguards both competition 
and  democracy,  realigning  ownership  rules  to  adapt  to  the  new  market  that  is 
emerging. In other words, we should act to encourage a dynamic market whilst at the 
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